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Abstract
Rate base research was conducted in the early days of the electric
utility industry; however, the early studies were void of statistical
rigor. In an important publication in 1962, Eiteman first brought
strict statistical methods to bear in a study of the impact of public
utility regulation on fifteen Bell Telephone Companies. After Eiteman's
work, a number of additional statistical studies examined the rate base
question.
Evidence indicates that regulators are feeling pressure from the
courts to employ a fair value rate base in their deliberations; yet, the
impact of such a change has not been unambiguously determined.
Using time series data, for a sample of firms from states which
actually changed rate base methods since IW II, this study concludes
that a change to fair value valuation will not automatically result in
higher earnings for electric utility firms. Moreover, the results show
that regulatory commissions frequently overcompensate or undercompensate
utility firms for the effects of inflation whenever they establish the
level of allowed earnings and prices.

INFLATION AND RATE BASE VALUATION
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr., Edward Bubnys and Robert H. Rasche
I
. INTRODUCTION
Valuation of public utility property for rate making purposes has
been controversial since the beginning of the institution of public
regulation. Even though much academic research and practical experience
has evolved since utility commissions first became the formal regulators
of public utility businesses, there is no consensus of academicians nor
practitioners concerning the appropriate value of physical property used
for providing service to customers. In public utility rate making, the
value of this physical property, net of depreciation, is called the rate
base.
An important question is how well do regulatory processes compensate
for inflation. Hence, the rate base valuation issue is not of academic
interest only; indeed, it has been said that the rate base is at the core
of the rate determination process in practice. The importance of rate
base determination, in practice, is reflected in several recent cases
before the Illinois Supreme Court. One particular case involved an ap-
peal of a rate case which had been completed by the Illinois Commerce
2Commission. Union Electric Co. was dissatisfied with the disposition
of their request for rate increases and appealed the judgments of the
Illinois Commerce Commission to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court
ruled that the Commerce Commission must use "fair value" in the rate
3
making process. The most interesting aspect of this case, for this
study, is that Illinois had previously used a "fair value" basis for rate
making but changed to "original cost" on March 13, 1973. This situation
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reflects recent interest by the Courts and it also indicates, in the
opinion of the Court and the utility company involved, that there would
be significant differences in the result of a given rate case depending
upon whether original cost or fair value rate base valuation is used in
the proceedings.
There has been considerable regulatory energy and academic research
devoted to examining the question of what constitutes the "correct" basis
for valuation of the rate base of utility firms. Results of several
previous studies show that there is statistically no earnings difference
between firms regulated in original cost and fair value jurisdiction.
These results seem to indicate that the recent ruling of the Illinois
Supreme Court seems to be without sound basis in economic reality; a
change in rate base methods would not change the level of realized earn-
ings of utility firms.
The topic is important but results of past research have obviously
not been convincing to regulators and the Court; consequently, further
research on the performance effects of different rate base methods is
useful and necessary.
This study attempts to answer two important questions. First, do
rate base methods matter? That is, are there any important results
caused by changes in regulatory regimes from fair value to original cost
or vice versa. Second, if regulators do cause any important changes,
do they just adequately compensate or over compensate the utility firms
for changes taking place on the price level. The overall main purpose
of this study is to determine whether methods of rate base valuation
affect the earnings, prices and output of electric utility firms by using
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technlques and data designed to avoid some problems in other studies of
rate base methods.
Generally, the results of this study reveal that there does not
seem to be any systematic relationship between methods of rate base
determination and profits or prices charged by electric utility firms.
While there were instances where the results supported the proposition
that fair value methods would yield higher profits and prices than ori-
ginal cost techniques, the results were scattered. The results show
that regulatory commissions, of firms included in the sample, were us-
usally either over compensating or under compensating for inflation oc-
curring in the economy.
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES
The economic literature of rate base determination is extensive.
4
Hays in 1913, for example, presented a comparison of original cost and
replacement cost rate base determination. In a 1924 study, Ruggles
carefully evaluated the "Fair Return" concept in utility regulation, and
in 1926 Bonbright examined the valuation of property as a basis for
rate regulation. Since those early studies, there have been many other
examinations of virtually every facet of the rate base problem; however,
only four papers, discussed below, are of particular interest to this
analysis.
In an important seminal paper in 1962, Eiteman examined the impact
of public utility regulation on fifteen Bell Telephone Companies. In
examining the permitted and earned rates of return, Eiteman found that the
original cost regulation jurisdictions have permitted the highest rates of
return on rate bases and firms operating in reproduction cost jurisdictions
-4-
have been permitted the lowest. Similar results were reported by
9
Hagerman and Eatchford. Eiteman found, however, that the higher per-
mitted rates had been only partially compensatory because in the 1950-59
period, "...actual rates of return to book value of securities (that is
to original cost)...have been highest for companies in the reproduction-
cost jurisdictions and lowest for the companies in the original cost
jurisdictions." Eiteman carefully explains that the results of his
study apply only to the 15 Bell Telephone Companies in his sample.
Using data for 1961-1963, Pike found that the mean rate of return
was 6.38 percent on net plant in original cost states and a 6.63 percent
where other valuation methods were used. Pike noted that the spread
between earnings under the different valuation methods had narrowed and
was not statistically significant.
Primeaux examined realized rates of return earned by 116 firms in
12
1967 and 124 firms in 1973. The 1967 sample was composed of sixty-six
electric utility firms from original cost jurisdictions, forty-two from
fair value jurisdictions and eight from reproduction cost states. The
1973 sample consisted of seventy-three firms from original cost states,
forty-three fromi fair value jurisdictions and eight regulated by repro-
13duction cost methods. The study employed analysis of variance tech-
niques and the results revealed that, statistically, there was no differ-
ence in earnings of firms in the sample according to method of rate base
determinations. That is, the three most commonly used methods of rate
base determination resulted in firms earning approximately the same
rates of return. The conclusions were the same for both the 1967 and
the 19 73 samples.
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Rock raised several questions concerning the rate base classifica-
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tions used in the Primeaux study. Rock's approach caused the sample
composition between original cost and fair value firms to change slightly.
Rock also used analysis of variance and tested the results of Primeaux's
study. He also expanded data to include 1974 and 1975. All but one
of the reclassifications were disputed by Primeaux. Nevertheless,
even after considering all of his proposed reclassifications. Rock also
concluded that rate base methods were unimportant, thereby confirming
Primeaux's findings.
Several questions may be raised about the previous studies which
affect the quality of their results. First, book value of securities
as used by Eiteman and net plant used by Pike, may not be satisfactory
proxies for a rate base; if not, the results of their studies were af-
fected by the nature of the proxies used for the rate base. Second,
Eiteman acknowledged that the applicability of his conclusions must be
limited to the 15 Bell Telephone firms included in his sample. Conse-
quently, further study of electric utilities is justified. Third, the
Primeaux and Rock studies involved analysis of variance as their statis-
tical techniques and other uncontrolled variables could have affected
the results of the statistical tests used. Fourth, all of the previous
studies mentioned above involved cross section data. The nature of cross
section data raises serious questions concerning the integrity of the
results because of the lack of uniformity of procedures for computing
rate bases by State Commissions. All states, for example, do not compute
fair value in the same way. The nature of the data used in this study
tends to hold constant the technique used in applying a given rate base
method.
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All of the above questions and problems could have affected the
results of the previous studies and they certainly indicate that further
research is necessary to assess correctly the impact of rate base methods
on rates of return realized by electric utility firms. Indeed, Ferguson
(a practitioner in regulatory matters) recently explained how and why
academic research is important in affecting the outcome of actual rate
18
cases. He argues that it is important to develop more accurate infor-
mation and confirm research results to assure their validity because
19they will affect regultory decisions.
III. THE THEORY
Conceptually, the rate making procedure is very straight forward.
The regulators of public utility firms are charged with the responsibility
of setting rates which will be high enough to permit the firm to earn a
fair return on its investment but not so high as to yield an economic
profit. The rate making equation is as follows:
Cost of service = RIl=E + d + T +(V - D)R
where
:
RR = revenue requirement of the firm
E = current operating expenses (excluding depreciation)
d = current depreciation expenses
T = current taxes
V = gross value of physical property
D = accrued depreciation
R = rate of return
-7-
CV - D) = rate base
(V - D)R = return amount.
In the process of a rate case, the firm is allowed to recover,
through future rates charged for it's services, all of the current oper-
ating expenses incurred, including current depreciation and taxes.
Moreover, as indicated in the above rate making equation, the firm is
also allowed to include in the rates charged for it's services a com-
ponent to cover (V - D)R. That is, the value of the rate base multiplied
by a rate of return (this is the return amount) . This is a key concept
in the following discussion.
The appropriate values for E, d, T, D are rather straightforward.
They essentially consist of expenses which the firm is allowed to re-
20
cover from rate payers. This is not to say that they are not the
cause of occasional disputes. Instead, the point being made is that
the determination of the rate base dominates all other problems in
public utility regulation. This point is very clearly made by Phillips:
Determination of the rate base... is one of the most
important and most difficult problems confronting
both the Commission and the regulated industries.
No other conflict in the history of ^regulation has
been subject to so much litigation.
Original cost jurisdictions value the (V - D) component in the
equation at the value of the property v/hen it was first installed in
a public utility application. Fair value attempts to adjust the value
of the (V - D) component to that level which more correctly reflects its
current value and reproduction cost attempts to adjust the value of the
property to that level which would permit reproduction of the property.
Since the rate base (V - D) , would be larger in fair value jurisdictions
-8-
than in original cost states, the conventional view is that firms would
realize a higher rate of return in fair value states.
In a world of no inflation, original cost and fair value would yield
the same rate base value. The fundamental objective for establishing
fair value rate base valuation is to compensate business firms for the
change taking place in the value of money. Eli Clemens explained the
reason for departures from original cost valuation.
...it tends to yield to investors an income of constant
purchasing power. If prices rise and the value of money
declines, the rate base will be increased and the utility
investors will receive a greater return in monetary units
of smaller purchasing power. On the other hand, a stable
rate base tied to original cost would given investors
enhanced real income in times of low„prices and small
real income when prices are higher.
Price level changes are the real reason why fair value rate base valu-
ation is advocated by some economists.
After the Commission determines the "cost of service" of the public
utility firm, the next step in the rate making process is the determin-
ation of rates which the customers will pay for services. The Commission
instructs the utility to prepare, for its consideration, the appropriate
23
rate schedules to generate the allowed return. This procedure, of
course, involves assessments of different price elasticities in the dif-
ferent market segments. As mentioned earlier, in a world of no inflation,
profits and prices would be identical for a given firm regardless of
whether it is regulated by fair value or original cost rate base methods.
Vhen price level changes occur, however, the two methods yield different
results. Fair value rate base methods would allow higher nominal return
amounts to the utility than original cost rate base methods; consequently,
higher nominal prices would also accompany fair value rate making. The
-9-
actual effect of different rate base methods on real realized return
amounts and real prices, however, is not obvious. The final result
ultimately depends upon the success of the state regulatory commission
in compensating the utility firm for inflation occurring in the economy.
In actual practice, a firm may actually be overcompensated, undercompen-
sated, or just compensated by the utility commission as it attempts to
make adjustments, through time, to offset adverse effects of inflation
on the real earnings of the utility firm.
If regulation is efficient in a fair value jurisdiction, experiencing
no inflation, the real return amount earned by the utility would be con-
stant; the fair value approach allov7s for adjustment because of inflation,
so if no inflation occurred the real return amount would be constant
through time, in real terms. This would occur because the utility com-
mission has a real realized rate of return in mind which it considers
to be reasonable and commissioners will establish that rate of return
as the target in their deliberations. In figure 1, this result is shown
by the path of tt, indicated along b.
In a fair value situation, where inflation does exist, and the
regulators are efficient and just offsetting the effects of the infla-
tion, the path would still be flat as in the above discussion.
Whenever a state changes the method of rate base determination used
by its regulatory commission, the result on a firm's real earnings (and
real prices) cannot be unambiguously determined. For illustration, con-
sider a state which regulates utility firms by original cost rate base
determination. This case can be followed in Figure 1. The real earnings
for a firm would be ir (assuming no inflation through time) . Assume,
(V-D)R
P
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FIGURE 1
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then, that the state changes rate base valuation from original cost to
fair value at time t.. At that time, the earnings path may continue to
remain flat, if no inflation exists or if the state commission just com-
pensates the firm for inflation. However, the utility commission may
not just offset inflation. That is, the commission may overestimate
the amount of adjustment necessary to compensate for the inflation; in
this instance, earnings might follow path a, after the change in rate
base method at t . On the other hand, the commission could underesti-
c
mate the amount of adjustment necessary to offset inflation occurring
in the economy; in this case, the earnings path after the change in rate
base method might follow c in Figure 1.
In any of the cases discussed above, a reasonable assumption is
that once the regulatory commission begins to use a formula to arrive
at a fair value rate base it will probably continue to miscalculate over
some period of time.
VThile the actual effects of the two different rate base methods on
real earnings and prices is not obvious, it seems clear that original
cost rate making would yield greater welfare benefits than fair value
rate making. The reasons for this expectation are rather straight for-
ward. The electric utility demand curve is downward sloping; conse-
quently, lower consumption would take place under fair value than in
original cost rate making. Since a larger consumers surplus would re-
sult from original cost pricing, consumer v/elfare would be enhanced by
that valuation method.
The next section presents the procedure used to empirically test
for the effects of different rate base methods on realized rates of re-
turn, prices and output of a unique sample of electric utility firms.
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IV. PROCEDURE
Rather than use cross section data, as in previous studies, the
decision was made to examine the effect of rate base methods on indivi-
dual firms; therefore, the data consists of time series observations for
a selected sample of firms which are unique.
The sample consists of those firms located in states which changed
the method of rate base determination anytime during the period 1948-1978.
Consequently, it is possible to examine the effect of changes in rate
base valuation on individual firms.
The correct rate base classification used in each state was essen-
tial, so extreme care was taken to classify properly the firm.s which
would be included in the sample. This precaution vzas considered neces-
sary because there was some discrepancy in data sources concerning the
classification of some states according to rate base method. The re-
ported rate base method was validated by referring to six different
sources to assure that the correct rate base method was used in this
24
study. The rate base classifications were examined through time
to determine which states had changed method any time during the period
since WWII. In a few cases, where there was ambiguity even after re-
viewing the references, state regulatory commissions were contacted to
resolve remaining questions concerning rate base methods employed and
whether or not changes had occurred. This review revealed that only four
states had changed during the 1948-1978 time interval. Alabama changed
from fair value to original cost in 1971, Illinois changed from fair value
to original cost in 1973, North Carolina changed from original cost to
fair value in 1964 and Missouri changed from original cost to fair value
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in 1958. The fact that two states changed _to_ original cost and two
changed from original cost during the sample period tends to enhance
the value of the data.
All possible privately owned firms from each of the four states
changing rate base method during the 1948-1978 period were included in
the sample. Since publicly owned firms are largely free from state
regulation, and are sometimes given different regulatory treatment from
privately owned firms, it was decided to exclude them from the sample.
The final sample consisted of one firm from Alabama, seven from Illinois,
eight from Missouri, and four from North Carolina. Some firms were ex-
cluded from certain equations because they were only generating companies
and did not have residential sales. A few firms were totally omitted
because of insufficient data.
A separate set of equations was run for each firm in the sample;
ordinary least squares multiple regression was the approach used to
develop the equations. The procedure involved the use of five different
reduced-form equations for assessing the effects of rate base methods
on the earnings and prices of the individual firms in the sample.
A model of the demand and cost functions for firms was derived to
obtain the reduced-form equations. This step was necessary to specify
correctly the variables which would affect the performance of the depen-
dent variables for the profit maximizing monopolists included in the
sample.
Sequentially, the econometric procedure was as follows: first,
the data for all sample observations V7ere included in the reduced form
equations for each individual firm. Second, an equation was run for
-14-
each firm, for each dependent variable, using only the long sub sample
of data. For example, in the state of Illinois, the rate base method
was fair value from 1948-1972 and original cost from 1973. Consequently
the long sub sample, for firms in that state, would consist of the fair
value observations which occurred during the 1948-1972 period. The
long sub sample period differed from state to state, depending on when
the rate base valuation change took place. The residuals computed from
these regressions were used in subsequent steps in the analysis.
In the third step, the long sub sample regression was extrapolated
(forward or backward, depending upon the situation) through the short
sub sample time period and the mean error was computed for the short
sub sample. Fourth, the standard error of forecast was computed for
each short sub sample time period based on estimates for the long sub
sample. Fifth, under the assumption that the standard error of fore-
casts are independent across time, the standard error of the mean fore-
cast error was comiputed during the short sub sample period. Finally,
the ratio of the mean error for the short sub sample to the standard
error of the mean forecast error was used to compute a t ratio for the
mean forecast error of the short sub sample. Each of the above six
steps was followed for each dependent variable, for each firm in the
1 26sample.
V. El-IPIRICAL RESULTS
Realized Rates of Return Proxies
The reduced form equation for the rate base effects for the firm
is as follows:
-15-
Y = B, + B„LGNP + B-LVA + B.LPOP + B^LPE + B,LC + B^LCAP + BoT12 34 567 8
+ B^LGP + B^qIT + U
where: Y = dependent variable, explained below
LGNP = natural log of real GNP, in billions of dollars
LVA = natural log of real value added by manufacturing, in billions
of dollars
LPOP = natural log of state population, in thousands of persons
LPE = natural log of real production expenses, in dollars
LC = natural log number of ultimate consumers, by number of con-
suming units
LCAP = natural log of the number of production plants operated by
the firm
T = a time trend, a linear index where 1948 = 0, 1949 =1, ...
1978 = 30
LGP = natural log real natural gas price, state averages, in
thousands of dollars per trillion BTUs
IT = a profitability trend for the industry (net income of all
electric utilities in the U.S., divided by operating
revenue of all electric utility firms in the U.S.)
U = a random disturbance term.
The data and its sources are discussed in the appendix. In an attempt
to develop a thorough analysis, two different realized rates of return
dependent variables were used and different realized rates of return
equations v;ere run for each firm in the sample. Consequently, Y was
defined in two different ways when examining the effect of rate base
methods on realized earnings of the firms in the sample.
Log Y = natural log real firm operating income per thousand KWH
sold to ultimate consumers.
Y = firm operating income as a percent of net plant.
-16-
The procedure involved in this section, and the study as a whole,
generated a large number of regressions and variables so, similar to
27Jarrell, only partial information is reported in the tables.
The next two sections present the empirical results for the two
different dependent variables used as proxies for the realized rate of
return earned by firms in the sample.
Real Firm Operating Income Per Thousand KWH Sold
Table 1 presents some statistics extracted from the individual firm
equations with log real operating income per unit sold as the dependent
variable. As mentioned earlier, throughout the analysis, the size of
the long sub samples used to develop the firm equations in each state
depended upon the year in which the rate base method was changed.
The t statistics indicate whether the change in rate base method af-
fected real operating income. The table shows that the one firm in the
sample from Alabama actually earned a higher real operating income per
thousand KI'TH sold after the rate base method was changed from fair value
to original cost. These results reveal that the utility commission over-
compensated for inflationary effects in permitting the firm to earn
higher real profits after method of rate base determination was changed
to original cost.
Table 1 also shows that only one firm of the six from Illinois ex-
perienced lower real operating income per thousand kilowatt hours sold
to ultimate consumers when that state changed from fair value to original
cost; regulators have overcompensated for the effects of inflation in
all other cases except for Illinois Power. In that case, the utility
commission held real earnings constant and the firm earned the same real
-17-
TABLE 1
Equation, Log Real Electric Utility Operating Income
Per Unit Sold to Ultimate Consumer (000 KWH)
Mean Error
.2132
.2288
ALABAMA (Fair value 1948-1970;
original cost 1971-1978)
Alabama Power Company
ILLINOIS (Fair value 1948-1972;
original cost 1973-1978)
Central Illinois Light Company
Central Illinois Public Service
Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Illinois Power Company
Mount Carmel Utility Company
Sherrard Power System
South Beloit Water, Gas and
Electric Company -
MISSOL^I (original cost 1948-1957;
fair value 1958-1978)
Empire District Electric Company -.4237
Kansas City Power & Light
Company -.1217
Missouri Edison Company .3448
Missouri Power & Light Company .1343
Missouri Public Service Company -.0858
Missouri Utility Company .3399
St. Joseph Light & Power -.7065
Union Electric Company -.9965
Standard
Deviation
.0402
t Value D.W. n
-2
.0742
3390 .0920
1227 .0719
0336 .0549
4137 .1131
7104 .1428
.0700
.0306
.1277
.1175
.1598
.1417
.0789
.1528
5.30 2.02 23 .9
3.08"^ 2.14 25
3.68'* 1.54 25
1.71" 1.98 25
0.61 1.49 25
3.66 1.58 25
-4.97 2.03 25
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
-6.05 1.55 21
-3.98^ 3.04 21
2.70^ 2.22 21
1.14 1.48 21
-0.54 2.44 21
2.40^ 1.95 21
-8.95^ 2.54 21
-6.52^ 2.21 21
.9
,9
,9
.9
.8
.9
.8
-18-
Standard
Mean Error Deviation t Value D.W. n R
NORTH CAROLINA (original cost
1948-1953; fair value
1964-1978)
Carolina Power & Light Company -.1893 .1681 -1.13 2.02 16 .9?
Duke Power Company 1.086 .1956 5.55^ 2.32 16 .9C
Nantahala Power & Light Company -3.609 .6182 -5.84^ 2.98 16 .7f
Yadkin, Inc. 5.216 2.0460 2.55^ 3.01 16 .92
a significant at the 1 percent level
b significant at the 5 percent level
c significant at the 10 percent level
Source: Extracted from complete equations containing all variables in
the model
.
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operating income per unit sold under both fair value and original cost
regulation.
In the case of Missouri, backward extrapolation was used to compute
the mean error and standard deviation of the forecast because the
short sub sample occurs before the change in regulatory regimes. Table
1 reveals that two firms earned the same real operating income per kwh
sold after the state of Missouri changed from original cost to fair
value rate base valuation. Two firms earned higher real operating earn-
ings under original cost valuation than under fair value rate making.
The remaining five firms in the sample from Missouri all earned higher
real rates of return under fair value rate making than under the pre-
vious original cost regimes. As in the previous cases, the state regu-
latory commission either undercompensated or overcompensated for infla-
tion whenever real earnings were not identical under both regulatory
regimes.
Realized real operating income effects were also mixed for electric
utility firms in North Carolina after that state changed from original
cost to fair value regulation. As shown in Table 1, one firm earned
identical real operating income per kwh sold, while one firm earned
lower real returns under the new fair value regime and two firms exper-
ienced higher real returns after the changes from original cost to fair
value.
The above results show that the effects of changes in rate base
methods were rather mixed. State regulatory commissions did not tend
to hold real operating income of firms in their jurisdictions constant
when rate base valuation methods were changed.
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Net Income as a Percent of Net Plant
Table 2 presents socie test statistics for changes in rate base
methods in the equation with operating income as a percent of net plant
as the dependent variable. As in the previous case, the results are
inconsistent and scattered.
The one Alabama firm earned a lower percent of net plant under
original cost than under fair value regulation.
Two Illinois firms earned identical net incomes as a percent of
net plant under the original cost and fair value regulatory regimes;
two firms, however, experienced lower net incomes as a percent of net
plant after the state changed from fair value to original cost while
three firms experienced opposite results.
The returns from Missouri seemed to be somewhat more consistent
than those from Illinois. In that state, backward extrapolation into
the short sub sample revealed that six firms experienced higher incomes
as a percent of net plant under the previous original cost methods than
under the new fair value regulation. Only two firms had experienced
lower returns before the change to fair value than they experienced
after the change.
The North Carolina experience was similarly mixed. T\m firms ex-
perienced higher net income as a percent of net plant after that state
changed from original cost to fair value and two firms experienced op-
posite results.
Overall, the effects of changes in rate base methods on net incom.es
as a percent of net plant were mixed. As in the discussion of real op-
erating effects, state regulatory commissions seemed to be unsuccessful
-21-
TABLE 2
Equation Net Income as a Percent of Net Plant
Mean Error
ALABAMA (Fair value 1948-1970;
original cost 1971-1978)
Alabama Power Company
ILLINOIS (Fair value 1948-1972;
original cost 1973-1978)
Central Illinois Light Company
Central Illinois Public Service
Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Illinois Power Company
Mount Carmel Utility Company
Sherrard Power System
South Beloit Water, Gas and
Electric Company
MISSOURI (original cost 1948-1957;
fair value 1958-1978)
Empire District Electric Company
Kansas City Power & Light
Company
Missouri Edison Company
Missouri Power & Light Company
Missouri Public Service Company
Missouri Utility Company
St. Joseph Light L Power
Union Electric Company
-.0067
.0055
-.0965
.0199
Standard
Deviation
.0027
.0089
t Value D.W. n
-2.48" 2.22 23 .8
0.62 1.88 25
.0118 .0079 1.49*^ 1.56 25
.0002 .0059 -0.03 1.92 25
.0120 .0043 2.79^ 2.08 25
.0320 .0091 3.52^ 2.57 25
.0219 .0079 -2.77^ 2.17 25
.0086
.0065
0040 .0027
0379 .0067
0199 .0090
0653 .0206
0169 .0085
0217 .0075
0628 .0099
-11.22^ 1.86 25
3.06 1.21 21
1.48 1.82 21
5.66 2.61 21
2.21 1.62 21
3.17 1.74 21
1.99 1.99 21
-2.89 1.96 21
-6.34"^ 2.31 21
-22-
Standard
Mean Error Deviation t Value D.W. n_ R
NORTH CAROLINA (original cost
1948-1963; fair value
1964-1978)
Carolina Power & Light Company -.0200 .0067 -2.99^ 2.40 16 .9:
Duke Power Company .0690 .0122 5.66^ 2.11 16 .8i
Nantahala Power & Light Company -.1634 .0279 -5.86^ 2.40 16 .8^
Yadkin, Inc. .0628 .0317 1.98^ 2.73 16 .9(
a significant at the 1 percent level
b significant at the 5 percent level
c significant at the 10 percent level
Source: Extracted from complete equations containing all variables in
the model.
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at holding real earnings constant and either overcompensated or under-
compensated for the effects of inflation.
Price Effect Proxies
Two different price variables were used in the analysis to repre-
28
sent proxies for the pricing structure used by firms in the sample.
Individual price equations were run for each firm in the sample, for each
of the two price dependent variables. Consequently, Y, was defined in
two different ways when examining the effect of rate base methods on
prices charged by firms in the sample.
log Y = natural log of the real price of 250 KWH sales of electricity.
log Y = natural log of the real price of 500 KWH sales of electricity.
The same method of deriving and estimating the reduced form equations
was used for these two equations as was used in the realized rates of
return equations
.
As developed in the theory section, if regulatory commissions just
compensate for inflation, real prices would be expected to be identical
for a given firm in fair value and original cost rate base valuation as
a given state changes from one to the other. Consequently, one would
expect real prices to be raised or lowered if a state changed from one
rate base method to the other only if the state commission makes imper-
fect adjustments. This section assesses the price effects of different
rate base regulator^' regimes by examining two different price proxies;
the price of 250 KWH of residential electric service and the price of
500 KlvH of residential electric service.
Tables 3 and 4 show that there were substantial differences among
firms in the sample concerning the direction of real price movements
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TABLE 3
Equation Log Real Price of 250 KWH of Residential Electricity
Standard
Mean Error Deviation t Value D.W. n R
ALABAMA (Fair value 1948-1970;
original cost 1971-1978)
Alabama Power Company .2564 .0251 10.22^ 1.80 23 .98
ILLINOIS (Fair value 1948-1972;
original cost 1973-1978)
Central Illinois Light Company
Central Illinois Public Service
Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Illinois Power Company
Mount Carmel Utility Company
South Beloit Water, Gas and
Electric Company
MISSOURI (original cost 1948-1957;
fair value 1958-1978)
Empire District Electric Company -.3106
Kansas City Power & Light
Company -.1431
Missouri Edison Company .1971
Missouri Power & Light Company -.2257
Missouri Public Service Company .8274
Missouri Utility Company .3253
St. Joseph Light & Power -.4467
Union Electric Company -.7224
.2142 .0401 5.34^ 2.12 25 .94
.0265 .0468 0.57 1.91 25 .97
-.1630 .0346 -4.71^ 2.14 25 .97
-.1177 .0226 -5.21^ 2.53 25 .99
.1182 .0081 14.59^ 3.00 25 .99
.0516 .0358 1.44^ 1.92 25 .99
.0681 -4.56^ 0.89 21 .98
.0308 -4.65^ 2.31 21 .98
.0387 5.09^ 2.77 21 .97
.0629 -3.59^ 2.55 21 .95
.2048 4.04^ 2.47 21 .72
.0899 3.62^ 1.99 21 .80
.0603 -7.41^ 2.41 21 .97
.1432 -5.04^ 2.04 21 .94
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Standard
Mean Error Deviation t Value D.W. n
-2
NORTH CAROLINA (original cost
1948-1963; fair value
1964-1978)
Carolina Power & Light Company
Duke Power Company
.0827
.1574
.0136
.0240
6.08 2.74 16 .9
6.56 3.16 16
a significant at the 1 percent level
b significant at the 5 percent level
c significant at the 10 percent level
Source: Extracted from complete equations containing all variables in
the model.
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TABLE 4
Equation Log Real Price 500 KWH of Residential Electricity-
Mean Error
Standard
Deviation t Value D.W. n
ALABAMA (Fair value 1948-1970;
original cost 1971-1978)
Alabama Power Company
ILLINOIS (Fair value 1948-1972;
original cost 1973-1978)
Central Illinois Light Company
Central Illinois Public Service
Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Illinois Power Company
Mount Carmel Utility Com.pany
South Beloit Water, Gas and
Electric Company
MISSOURI (original cost 1948-1957;
fair value 1958-1978)
Empire District Electric Company
Kansas City Power & Light
Company
Missouri Edison Company
Missouri Power & Light Company
Missouri Public Service Company
Missouri Utility Company
St. Joseph Light & Power
Union Electric Company
,2089
,2324
,1156
,3339
.0195
.0313
0441 .0470
1210 .0334
1101 .0539
1859 .0116
.0409
.0381
1786 .0354
1071 .0391
2221 .0564
3794 .1352
4471 .1041
3836 .0538
7594 .1745
10.71 2.23 23
r2
,98
7.42 1.97 25 .98
0.94 1.94 25
-3.62'* 1.81 25
-2.04"^ 2.29 25
16.03 2.06 25
2.83 1.82 25
-8.76 1.23 21
-5.05 2.24 21
2.74 2.62 21
-3.94 2.93 21
2.81 2.48 21
4.29 2.73 21
-7.13 3.08 21
-4.35 1.69 21
.97
.98
.95
.99
.98
.99
.98
.97
.97
.73
.92
.98
.79
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Standard
-2
Mean Error Deviation t Value D.W. n R
NORTH CAROLINA (original cost
1948-1963; fair value
1964-1978)
Carolina Power & Light Company
Duke Power Company
.1254
.1994
.0136
.0265
9.22 2.74 16 .S
7.52 3.15 16
a significant at the 1 percent level
b significant at the 5 percent level
c significant at the 10 percent level
Source: Extracted from complete equations containing all variables in
the model.
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after rate base methods were changed in their respective states. Yet,
each individual finn in the sample experienced the same direction of
movement in its 250 kwh and 500 kwh real prices after the change was
made in its particular state. For this reason. Tables 3 and 4 will be
discussed together.
The one Alabama firm in the sample established higher real prices
after the state changed from fair value to original cost rate making.
One Illinois firm established identical real prices after that
state changed from fair value to original cost to those which had been
established prior to the change. Two firms, however, established lower
real prices after the change in rate base method, while three firms set
higher real prices.
In Missouri (using backward extrapolation) five firms established
lower real prices before that state changed from original cost to fair
value rate making higher real prices were set after the change. Three
firms, however, established lower real prices after the change in regu-
latory regimes.
The two North Carolina firms in the sample both set higher real
prices under fair value valuation than they had established under ori-
ginal cost regulation which existed before the change.
As in the case of the rate of return proxies, regulator^' commis-
sions seemed to be unable to just maintain real prices when their states
changed from one rate base method to the other. Consequently, the re-
sult was that firms were required to establish rates which either over
or under com.pensated for the effects of inflation when methods of rate
base valuation were changed.
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Consumer Welfare Proxy
This section examines the effect of different rate base valuation
methods on consumer welfare. The proxy used for consumer welfare was
per capita sales to ultimate consumers. As in previous analyses, indi-
vidual equations were run for each firm in the sample. The dependent
variable for these equations was defined as follows:
log Y = natural log of per capita electricity sold (total KWH
sold to ultimate consumers, divided by state population).
The same derivation and estimation method was used for these re-
duced form equations as in the earlier realized rates of return and
price equations.
According to the theory, reduced per capita consumption would occur
under higher prices. Since block rates are used in this business, it
was decided that per capita consumption is an important variable which
should be examined to determine whether changes in method of rate base
valuation ultimately resulted in restricted output and adversely affecting
consumer welfare.
The welfare effects of changes in regulatory regimes are reflected, .
to some extent, by the information in Table 5.
In the case of Alabama, the one firm in the sample experienced
larger sales per capita under fair value regulation than under original
cost valuation.
All but one of the Illinois firms experienced smaller per capita
sales under original cost valuation than under fair value regulation;
the one exception experienced identical per capita consumption under
both kinds of rate inaking.
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TABLE 5
Equation Log Sales (000 KWH) /State Population (000)
Standard
_„
Mean Error Deviation t Value D.W. n R
ALABAMA (Fair value 1948-1970;
original cost 1971-1978)
Alabama Power Company -.1145 .0209 -5.48^ 1.74 23 .99
ILLINOIS (Fair value 1948-1972;
original cost 1973-1978)
Central Illinois Light Company
Central Illinois Public Service
Company
Commonwealth Edison Company
Illinois Power Company
Mount Carmel Utility Company
Sherrard Power System
South Beloit Water, Gas and
Electric Company
MISSOURI (original cost 1948-1957;
fair value 1958-1978)
Empire District Electric Company .4110
Kansas City Power & Light
Company -.0883
Missouri Edison Company .2468
Missouri Power & Light Company -.0297
Missouri Public Service Company -.3417
Missouri Utility Company -.1594
St. Joseph Light & Power -.0745
Union Electric Company -.0826
-.2167 .0749 -2.89^ 1.94 25 .99
-.2696 .0337 -8.00^ 2.24 25 .99
-.0939 .0926 -1.01 1.42 25 .99
-.0254 .0151 -1.68'^ 2.01 25 .99
-.1799 .0729 -2.47^ 2.77 25 ,99
-.2969 .0389 -7.63^ 1.25 25 .99
-.2976 .0377 -7.89^ 2.19 25 .99
.0664 6.19^ 1.27 21 .99
.0168 -5.26^ 2.35 21 .99
.0732 3.37^ 1.10 21 .99
.0315 -0.94 1.90 21 .99
.0588 -5.81^ 2.34 21 .99
.0316 -5.04^ 2.19 21 .99
.0220 -3.39^ 2.60 21 .99
.0778 -1.06 2.4l 21 .99
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Standard
Mean Error Deviation t Value D.W. n R
NORTH CAROLINA (original cost
1948-1963; fair value
1964-1978)
Carolina Power & Light Company .1807
Duke Power Company .0397
Nantahala Power & Light Company .3419
Yadkin, Inc. .3289
.0544 3.32^ 2.40 16 .9
.0777 0.51 2.07 16 .9
.1192 2.87^ 3.38 16 .9
.8988 0.37 2.68 16 .9
a significant at the 1 percent level
b significant at the 5 percent level
c significant at the 10 percent level
Source: Extracted from complete equations containing all variables in
the model.
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Two Missouri firms experienced no change in per capita sales of
electricity after the rate base method was changed from original cost
to fair value. The data show, however, that four firms experience higher
per capita sales after the change to fair value rate making and two
firms experienced lower per capita sales.
Two firms from North Carolina incurred unchanged per capita sales
after that state changed from original cost to fair value valuation
methods. Two firms in that state, however, experienced higher per capita
sales after that state changed to fair value methods.
The above results fail to reflect any systematic pattern. It is
not at all clear that one is able to claim any welfare benefits for one
rate base method over the other. Of course, the weak result may be
caused by the ineffectiveness of the proxy used to reflect welfare ef-
fects. It is very difficult, however, to establish a better measure,
given the data which are available.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study do not support the notion that firms fare
better with respect to real realized earnings or real price levels under
fair value instead of original cost rate base valuation. Neither can a
case be made for enhanced consumer welfare because of higher consumption
levels under original cost rate regulation. While there were scattered
instances of the theory being upheld in the matter of profit, pricing,
and sales these results were certainly not general.
Since the results of this study are based on individual firms ex-
periencing changes in regulation, holding a large number of variables
constant, the findings may be more meaningful than previous cross section
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studies. A previous cross sectional study explained that the lack of
significance of rate base methods v/as affected by regulators allowing
29larger rates of return when rate base methods are do^vmward bias.
The results developed here clearly demonstrate that a state supreme
court ruling requiring a state to employ fair value rate making v/ill not
necessarily mean that a firm in that state will be allowed the same rate
of return on the larger rate base as that allowed on the smaller rate
30base and the firm will not necessarily earn a higher real profit.
The judgment that the fair value method will actually yield higher profit
for the firm is without foundation in fact. Moreover, the ruling of the
Illinois Supreme Court seems to be in conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court
ruling in the Hope Natural Gas Co. (1942) case where the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the end result in rate making was all that really mattered.
The Hope ruling means that regulatory commissions are not required to
use any single valuation method or combination of methods. The process
involved in getting to the end result is inconsequential.
Murray, who has had considerable experience on the practical side
of utility regulation recently made the following statement:
After observing a variety of commissions and their
staffs at work, in both fair value and original cost
jurisdictions there appears to be no procedural dif-
ferences in their determination of rate of return. .
.
in actual practice there is not likely to be any
operational differences in the activities behind
closed doors of fair value and original cost regu-
latory commissions .. .there are two reasons for this,
in my opinion. On the one hand, the fair value rate
base has been operationally and legally discredited,
and on the other hand, commissioners and commission
staff, in viewing the regulatory procedural problems
currently, do not conceptually distinguish between
fair value and original cost. . .regardless of how the
final order of a rate case is written, somewhere in
31
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the working papers and the actual record, available
to commissioners as they reach a final decision, is
a rate of return on an orignal cost rate base.
Indeed, if the spirit of the Hope case permeates the state commis-
sions, as Murray suggests, and they "manipulate" the rate of return to
arrive at a "predetermined" return amount, this practice very likely
helped to bring about the results presented in this analysis. From the
Commission perspective, rate base methods do not really matter.
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APPENDIX
The Data and Sources
All data expressed in real terms were deflated by the implicit
price deflator. The electric utility operating data were obtained from
Statistics of Privately-Ovned Electric Utilities in the United States
(Washington, B.C.: U.S. Federal Power Commission, various years).
Pricing data were obtained from Typical Electric Bills (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Federal Power Commission, various years). Population data were
obtained from Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, various years). GNP data were obtained
from the Economic Report of the President, 1980 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1979). Value added by Manufacturing came
from two sources : Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial
Times to 1970 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), and
Statistical Abstract of the United States . Natural gas prices were ob-
tained from revenue and physical sales data found in Gas Facts (American
Gas Association annual reports, various years).
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